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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
CONSUMER CREDIT SALES and the OKLAHOMA
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
The thirty-second session of the Oklahoma Legislature,
after a great deal of controversy and publicity, passed House
Bill 1001, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code.' The Okla-
homa act is a modified version of the Uniform Code2 prepar-
ed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws for introduction in state legislatures and for sub-
mission to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System for the requested exemption from the Consumer
Credit Protection Act3 (commonly called the Federal Truth
in Lending Act).
The Uniform Code is designed to replace the piecemeal
legislation that has developed over the years4 due to a chang-
ing environment of credit and the various pressure groups
1 Law of May 8, 1969, ch. 352, § § 1-101 to 9-103, [1969] Okla.
Sess. Laws 533 (codified as title 14A) [hereinafter cited
as the Okla. U3C, an unofficial designation for the con-
sumer credit code which has been adopted by a number of
writers].
2 UNIFoRM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE [hereinafter cited as
UCCC]. The Uniform Code was approved by the Uniform
Commissioners on July 30, 1968 and by the ABA on August
7, 1968.
8 Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-77 (Supp. IV 1969). [hereinafter referred to as CCPA].
This Act provides that the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System may exempt from certain provisions
credit transactions in a state which has substantially similar
requirements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1633, 1675 (Supp. IV 1969).
4 The OKLA. U3C § 9-102 provides for the repeal of:
(a) The Oklahoma Small Loan Act of 1941, OKLA. STAT.
tit. 15, §§ 280.1-.29 (1961).
(b) The Oklahoma Retail Installment Sales Act, OxLA.
STAT. tit. 15, §§ 701-12 (Supp. 1968).
(c) OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 261, 264, 267-70, 273 (1961).
(d) And any other laws or parts of laws in conflict.
[V9ol. 6, No. I
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operating within this environment and will place all the
laws dealing with consumer credit in one code. Since it is
presented as a uniform law, decisions from other jurisdictions
may help speed the development of a reliable interpretation
of its provisions. However, the degree of such aid will be
dependent upon any variance from the Uniform Code.
The growth of importance of consumer credit in our so-
ciety has raised a considerable question about the possible
excessive use of credit, its effect upon the economy, its cost-
liness, and the need for control. Among writers on the sub-
ject opinion varies greatly as to the need for and the nature
of controls on consumer credit, ranging from favoring strict
federal control to laissez faire. The Uniform Code has been
the subject of numerous articles pro and con since it became
a formal project of the Uniform Commissioners in 1963.5 These
articles have taken divergent views regarding the propriety
of consumer credit as a subject for uniform legislation as well
as the desirability of the Code's treatment of specific provi-
For an exhaustive analysis of state laws concerning credit
see B. CuRto, TRENDs IN CONSUMER CREDrr LEGISLA-
TION (1965). See also Curran, Legislative Controls as a Re-
sponse to Consumer Credit Problems, 8 B.C. IND. & Com.
L. RaV. 409 (1967).
Buerger, Project on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer
Credit, Small Loans and Usury, 18 PEaRS. Fn . L.Q. REP. 110
(1964).
o A sampling of various articles shows that the USC has
been viewed as a
good compromise between conflicting viewpoints of the
industry and the consumer, see Robinson, The Uniform
Consumer Credit Code: A New Way of Life for the
Consumer Loan Industry, 22 PER. Fm. L.Q. REP. 118
(1968);
"Uniform Chaos Confounded Code", a bombshell which
should be detonated before it's too late, see Denonn,
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code Bombshell, 22 PFas.
FiN. L.Q. REP. 125, 130 (1968);
19691
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sions.0 The entrance of the federal government into the con-
sumer credit field has added the controversy of state versus
federal control. The Uniform Code may or may not be the
answer to consumer credit problems, but it is at least an
indication of the growing awareness of the part credit plays
in the lives of the American public7 and the need for changes
in this area of law.
Both the Uniform Code and the Oklahoma U3C separate
the provisions dealing with consumer credit sales" and con-
sumer loans9 into two articles. The Special Committee of the
National Conference on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer
Credit, Small Loans and Usury, who drafted the Uniform
Code, felt this division was necessary in order to preserve the
proposal unsatisfactory to the National Association of
Consumer Credit Administrators, see 22 PEAs. FmN. L.Q.
REP. 131 (1968);
consumer credit code for lenders, see CoNsumER REPORTS
121 (Mar. 1969);
substantial improvement over the present system, see
Felsenfeld, Uniform, Uniformed and Unitary Laws Reg-
ulating Consumer Credit, 37 Foi.Av L. REv. 209 (1968);
workable balance between protection of the consumer
and the right of the creditor to have debts repaid and
to make a reasonable profit in his business, see Bailey,
The Substantive Provisions of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code: 20th Century Consumer Protection in a
Free Enterprise System, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 597 (1968).
7 The Federal Reserve Board reported installment credit out-
standing at the end of February, 1969 at 89.4 billion dollars
and total consumer credit was reported at 111.6 billion dol-
lars. Its estimates include loans to individuals for household,
family and other personal expenditures, excluding real
estate mortgage loans. 55 FED. RESEIVE BuLL. A52 (April
1969).
8 Article 2 also deals with consumer leases, but for the most
part the Code treats sales and leases in the same way.
9 Okla. U3C art. 3.
[Vol. 6, No. 1
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time-price doctrine0 in those states which had not adopted
the Code. The draftsmen felt there would be serious conse-
quences" to both consumer and credit grantor if any en-
couragement were given to the courts of a non-code state to
rely upon the provisions which reject the time-price doc-
trine.12 Many of the provisions of the two articles are the
same, merely substituting the words "consumer loan" for
"consumer credit sale." The main force behind making the
distinction between sales and loans appears to have been the
fear of the extra-territorial effect of rejecting the time-price
doctrine and the historical differences in regulation of credit
sellers and money lenders.'3
Because of the length and complexity of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, the scope of this article will be re-
stricted to the provisions of Article 2 of the Code which place
limitations on agreements and practices which may be used
in consumer credit sales and the provisions of Article 5 deal-
ing with creditor and debtor remedies. This article will not
discuss the provisions of Article 2, dealing with disclosure
and maximum rates of credit service charges; Article 3, deal-
ing with loans; Article 4, dealing with insurance in consumer
credit transactions; and Article 6, Administration.
10 Under the time-price doctrine a sale on credit can be made
at a higher price than a sale of the same item for cash and
the price difference is not within the ambit of usury law
]imitations on rates of interest. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 702 (8)
(1961); e.g., Cobb v. Baxter, 292 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1956);
Mondie v. GMAC, 178 OiKA. 584, 63 P.2d 708 (1937).
11 See Richter, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 24 Bus. LAW. 183 (1968).
12 The Code defines credit service charge to include any time-
price differential. Okla. U3C § 2-109 (1).
13 See Felsenfeld, Uniform, Uniformed and Unitary Laws Reg-
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LIMITATIONS ON AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICES
IN CONSUMER CREDIT SALES
A number of current practices are limited in consumer
credit sales.14 These practices are regarded as inherently abu-
sive or have been the subject of substantial abuse in the past.16
Multiple Agreements
Multiple agreements may not be used by the credit sell-
er with the intent to obtain a higher credit service charge
than permitted.' 6 This is to cover the situation where a sell-
er, authorized17 to charge a maximum of 30% per year on
the amount financed which is $300 or less, tries to charge
that rate on an amount financed of $600 by making two
separate $300 sales. This provision is essentially the same as
it was in the Retail Installment Sale Act 8 and does not pro-
vide any new protection for the consumer.
Certain Negotiable Instruments Prohibited
The use of negotiable paper has been subject to much
abuse in the area of consumer sales. Here the consumer has
often realized only too late that he must pay to a third party
even though the goods are defective or there is absence or
failure of consideration by the seller. The consumer may
never have contemplated having to pay a third party for
the goods or services he has purchased, but if the third party
has maintained a relationship (more appropriately, a lack of
4 See note 8 supra.
15 For a general discussion of abuse in the area of consumer
credit and selling, see D. CAPLOViTZ, THE POOR PAY MORE
(1963).
16 Okla. U3C § 2-402.
17 Okla. U3C § 2-201 (2) (a).
18 This Act stated that "No seller may induce a buyer to be-
come obligated at substantially the same time under more
than one retail installment contract or obligation for the
purpose of obtaining a higher service charge than would
apply to one obligation." OKiA. STAT. tit. 15, § 706.2 (Supp.
1968).
[Vol. 6, No. I
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relationship) with the seller so as to qualify as a holder in
due course, the consumer will have to pay him.19 The Code's
remedy for this is a prohibition against the use of negotiable
instruments (except checks) in consumer credit sales. It pro-
vides that a subsequent holder is not in good faith if he takes
with notice that the negotiable instrument arose out of a
consumer credit sale transaction.20 It was the opinion of the
drafters of the Uniform Code that since the prohibition would
be known in the financial community, the professional fin-
anciers could not qualify as holders in due course. However,
the rare case of a holder far enough removed from the trans-
action to qualify as a holder in due course and the possible
inequities which could arise was the drafters' justification
for not completely eliminating this doctrine in consumer cred-
it sales.21
Waiver of Defenses
Similar to the problems arising in negotiable instruments
is the waiver of defenses when a contract has been trans-
ferred by the seller.22 Oklahoma adopted, with some revision,
Alternative B of the Uniform Code,23 the more creditor orient-
ed viewpoint. Where the Uniform Code had provided for a
19 OILA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 3-302 (1961); e.g., James Talcott, Inc.
v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988 (Okla. 1964).
20 Okla. U3C § 2-403. An exception is a sale or lease primarily
for agricultural purposes. The Retail Installment Sales Act
specifically allowed the use of negotiable contracts. OLA.
STAT. tit. 15, § 701 (c) (Supp. 1968).
21 See UCCC § 2.403, Comment. Possibly a better way to have
handled the matter would have been to require any instru-
ment of a negotiable nature to be marked plainly non-
negotiable and to provide that if a seller violated the pro-
vision, the subsequent taker would have a remedy against
the seller.
22 Okla. U3C § 2-404.
23 Alternative A had provided that an assignee of the Rights
of the seller was subject to all the defenses of the buyer
despite any agreement to the contrary. However, the as-
signee's liability was limited by the amount owed at the
1969]
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three-month period, the Oklahoma U3C provides only a 30-
day notice period. After this period an agreement by the buy-
er to not assert a claim or defense arising out of the sale be-
comes enforceable by the assignee as to claims which arose
against the seller prior to the end of the 30-day period. The
Oklahoma U3C 24 provides that an agreement is enforceable
only if the assignee is not related to the seller, acquires the
contract in good faith and for value, gives the buyer the
required notice and does not receive written notice of the
facts giving rise to the buyer's defense before the 30 days are
up. The Code also provides that an assignee does not take
in good faith if he had knowledge or notice of substantial
complaints about the seller's business practices specifically
regarding the seller's failure to honor his contracts or to
promptly remedy his defaults.25 Under this alternative, the
buyer's claim is limited to the amount owing at the time the
claim is asserted and only by way of defense or set-off to
the assignee's claim. It is unfortunate for consumers that the
notice period was cut from 3 months to 30 days. The speed
with which sellers often assign their contracts may make it
more difficult for the buyer to discover the grounds for a
claim prior to the end of the period. However, the provision
may encourage those who handle consumer paper to make a
closer inspection of the assignors' business practices in order
to further protect themselves. 26
time the defense was asserted and the buyer could not
assert his rights under the section except as a matter of
defense or set-off against the claim of the assignee. UCCC
§ 2.404 Alt. A.
2 Okla. U3C § 2-404(1).
25 Okla. U3C § 2-404(2).
26 Of course "a financier may discount with or without re-
course and may withhold discount proceeds in a reserve
fund to cover off-sets arising from buyers' defenses." Bailey,
The Substantive Provisions of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code: 20th Century Consumer Protection in a Free Enter-
prise System, 29 Oino ST. L.J. 597, 618 N. 139 (1968).
[Vol. 6, No. I
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Balloon Payments
The Oklahoma U3C does not prohibit "balloon payments"
(a payment which is more than twice as large as the av-
erage of earlier payments), but it gives the buyer the un-
qualified right to refinance that payment on terms that are
no less favorable than the original agreement and to do so
without penalty.27 In the case of a consumer lease, other than
one primarily for agriculture, a special provision prohibits
balloon payments at the end of the lease period which exceed
twice the average payment allocable on a monthly basis.2 8
The Retail Installment Sales Act had provided, with respect
to unequal payments, only that the installment contract con-
tain the information that the debt was not repayable in equal
installments and that it state the amount of the larger in-
stallment and its due date.29 This provision of the Oklahoma
U3C gives considerably more protection to the consumer than
previously afforded by mere disclosure under the Retail In-
stallment Sales Act. Since the use of balloon payments has
been subject to abuse2 ° by some creditors in the past, it seems
to be an appropriate remedy which is not likely to substan-
tially affect the scrupulous seller and the practical effect may
well be to end the use of balloon payments. There does not
appear to be much value to the seller if he is required to re-
finance the payment on the same terms as the original agree-
ment.
Security Interests
Under the Oklahoma U3C the seller can take a security
interest in goods sold or in goods upon which services are per-
27 Okla. U3C § 2-405.
28 Okla. U3C § 2-406.
29 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 703(5) (k) (Supp. 1968).30 "Its use allows the creditor to quote unusually small in-
stallment payments, leaving the debtor with a final pay-
ment so large that it may force him to default." Helstad,
Consumer-Credit Legislation: Limitations on Contractual
Terms, 8 B.C. IxD. & Com. L. REv. 519, 526 (1967).
1969]
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formed or to which the goods sold are annexed,3 1 if the se-
cured debt is for $200 or more.32 The seller can take a security
interest in land only if the debt is for $1,000 or more,33 and
the goods sold are affixed to the land or the land is improv-
ed, maintained or repaired as a result of the sale of goods
or services.3 4 On the whole this policy toward restricting the
taking of real estate as collateral seems proper in that it pre-
vents the clouding of title to real property for a small credit
transaction. It is also designed to prevent overreaching by
creditors in situations in which deceptive practices have oc-
cured in the past. Likewise, the limitation on a security in-
terest in personalty is designed to prevent the loss of larger
items because of failure by the debtor on smaller credit trans-
actions.
Cross-Collateral
The taking of a security interest as cross-collateral is
limited except where as a result of a prior sale the seller has
an existing security interest in the property.3 5 Or, as security
for a previous debt, the seller may take a security interest
in property subsequently sold.3 6 The Code also provides for
a first-in-first-out arrangement in the event of cross-collateral
or consolidation of the debt. Payments are applied to the
debt owed on goods purchased first and the security interest
in such goods is terminated when the debt applicable to that
sale is paid.37 If two or more sales were made the same day
by the same seller to the same buyer the payments are ap-
plied first to the smaller debt.38
31 Okla. U3C § 2-407 (1).
32 The UCCC provides that the debt secured must be $300 or
more. UCCC § 2.407 (1).
33 Okla. U3C § 2-407(1).
34 Id.
3r Okla. U3C § 2-408 (1).
36 Id.
37 Okla. U3C § 2-409 (1).
38 Okla. U3C § 2-409 (3).
[Vol. 6, No. I
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The provision for allocation of payments is different than
the allocation provisions of the Retail Installment Sales Act 9
which had provided that after consolidation the amounts paid
would be applied to each of the various purchases on the
basis of the same ratio as the original cash sales price bore
to the total of all. Earlier drafts of the Code had used this
method.40 From the creditor's viewpoint it is not clear what
justification can be given for adopting a method which al-
lows the latter purchase to retain the original amount of debt
despite the declining value of the collateral. The Code's meth-
od has been criticized41 as an over reaction to the method
whereby payments are allocated on a ratio of debt remaining
at the time of consolidation. This method is particularly abu-
sive because it allows all the collateral to be tied up until
all debts are repaid.4 2
Referral Sales
The referral sales scheme is prohibited in consumer cred-
it sales.43 Any agreement involving a referral sales scheme,
where the buyer is induced to purchase because of the scheme,
is unenforceable by the seller and the buyer may rescind the
agreement or retain the goods delivered and the benefit of
any services performed without obligation to pay for them.4
30 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 703 (13) (c) (Supp. 1968).
40 UCCC Working Draft #4, § 2.409 (June, 1969).
41 One author suggests that the proper solution is the prac-
tice provided by most retail sales act which "keeps the
amount of the debts harmonious in relation to the original
amounts of debt and values of the collateral, and it releases
the first collateral after the associated debt should be deem-
ed to be retired." Kripke, Consumer Credit Legislation: A
Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 445, 475
(1968).
42 This method was deservedly questioned as unconscionable
in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
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This method of inducing a purchase,45 most often used in door-
to-door selling,46 is particularly disreputable because the sup-
ply of potential customers is exhausted in a very few rounds.47
Even if the seller had intentions of living up to the glowing
terms represented (an unusual situation) the mathematics
of the scheme would prevent it. Referral sales have been suc-
cessfully attacked under various theories. 48 In some jurisdic-
tions they have been struck down as lotteries within the mean-
45 Basically the scheme involves the potential purchaser be-
ing told that if he will submit a certain number of names
of potential customers who might be interested in pur-
chasing, he will receive a commission, prize or a discount
against his debt to the seller.
46 Referral sales are usually made in door-to-door sales be-
cause in their own home the buyer can be subjected to high
pressure tactics. Making it sound as if the buyer is getting
something for nothing will increase the sellers chance of
selling a product that the buyer knows he could not afford
to go purchase. In Norman v. Worldwide Distrib. Inc., 202
Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963), the buyers were told that
they would make enough off the plan to pay for the pur-
chase (price-$1080, fair retail price-$216) plus send their
daughter through college. The buyers did receive $80 for
referrals, however they supplied a list of names and should
have received $300 according to the representations made.
195 A.2d at 116. In State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc.,
52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966), there was
testimony by various consumer-witnesses that representa-
tions were made that participants could, earn as much as
$9,000, pay off the house, and that earnings were limitless.
275 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
47 Testimony by the Chief Accountant of the Bureau of Con-
sumer Frauds of the Office of the New York Attorney Gen-
eral showed that as a matter of "mathematical certainty"
and "economic feasibility" the plan was doomed to failure.
Because of the geometric progression, at the seventh level
it would involve millions of purchasers. State ex rel. Lef-
kowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 315
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
48 E.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966), rev'd in part,
[Vol. 6, No. I
11
Nay: Consumer Credit Sales and the Oklahoma Uniform Consumer Credit Co
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1969
CREDIT SALES AND CODE
ing of state constitutional provisions and statutes prohibiting
them.49 Although these schemes have been attacked in Okla-
homa as lotteries, such attacks have not met with success.
This is despite a statute which seemingly makes them il-
legal. Two 1963 cases held that the referral sales scheme did
not fall within the purview of the statute (prohibiting cer-
tain selling plans as lotteries) because it was not shown that
the buyer had agreed to secure others to participate but had
only been extended the privilege of so doing.51 The provision
of the Oklahoma U3C should effectively remedy the prob-
lems caused by the use of referral sales as inducements to
purchase. Since the Code does not apply to the use of re-
ferral schemes as long as it is not used to induce the pur-
chase, it does not destroy the basic idea which might have
economic merit in limited situations not dealing with credit
sales.52
54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term 1967). The
court found the referral sale to be unconscionable. The de-
fendant had been induced to purchase a $348 refrigerator
for $1,145 by being told he could pay for it by the com-
missions he would receive from sales to persons he could
refer the salesman to.
49 See e.g., M. Lippincott Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Childress, 204
So. 2d 919 (Fla. App. 1967); Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash.
2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1965). See generally Comment, Re-
ferral Sales Contracts: To Alter or Abolish, 15 BUFFALO
L. REv. 669 (1966); Comment, Let The Seller Beware-An-
other Approach to the Referral Sales Scheme, 22 U. Am
L. REV. 861 (1968).
ro OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1066 (1961).
51 A. A. Murphy, Inc. v. Taylor, 383 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1963)
(stereo sold on referral scheme); Krehbiel v State, 378
P.2d 768 (Okla. 1963) (vacuum sweepers sold on referral
scheme).
52 Generally this would be in a cash sale situation where more
even bargaining terms would exist and the buyer would
not have to deal later with a finance company.
19691
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The Oklahoma U3C provides that an assignment of earn-
ings for payment or security for payment of debts arising
from a consumer credit sale is unenforceable, 3 and an au-
thorization to confess judgment against the buyer is void.54
Although neither of these prohibitions is new in the regula-
tion of consumer credit sales,55 their rentention is of consid-
erable benefit to the consumer. Except for reasonable ex-
penses in realizing on a security interest, any agreement to
pay default charges, other than provided by the Act, is un-
enforceable.50
The Code provides that the buyer may continue to pay
the seller until he receives the required notice of assign-
ment.57. If a seller on a revolving charge wishes to change
his terms he must comply with specific notice requirements. 8
Home Solicitation Sales
In the case of home solicitation sales, the buyer is given
until midnight of the third business day after the agreement
is made in which to cancel any agreement or offer to pur-
chase.59 This so-called cooling off period is directed more to-
ward disreputable selling practices than it is to credit trans-
actions, but the purpose is to given the buyer a chance to
think over the purchase of goods which are very likely to
be inferior, overpriced and sold under high pressure tactics. 0
Experience has shown however that these sales are tied into
53 Okla. U3C § 2-410.
4 Oka. U3C § 2-415.
r5 The Retail Installment Sales Act prohibited both of these
practices. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 706(1) (b) (Supp. 1968).
56 Okla. U3C § 2-414.
57 Okla. U3C § 2-412; see OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-318 (3)
(1961).
58 Okla. U3C § 2-416.
59 Okla. U3C § 2-502 (1).
60 See Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period In Door to Door Sales,
15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 717 (1968).
[Vol. 6, No. I
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financing arrangements and are therefore a proper subject
of credit legislation. A prerequisite to t h e running of
the three-day period is that of giving the required no-
tice of the buyer's right to cancel.61 This notice must be
in a signed and dated written agreement or offer, unless the
buyer has requested the goods or services on an emergency
basis, and must contain the specific language directed by
the Code.6 2 The buyer does not have the right to cancel the
purchase of goods or services requested on an emergency basis
if the seller has in good faith substantially begun to perform
or if the goods cannot be returned.6 The seller may retain
up to 5% of the cash price, not to exceed the cash down pay-
ment, as a cancellation fee when the buyer exercises his right
to cancel under this section.6 4 However, the seller must re-
store to the buyer any payment in excess of the cancellation
fee and any note or other evidence of indebtedness within
ten days after the rescission.65 Following the rescission the
buyer must return, upon demand of the seller, any goods de-
livered by the seller. Failure of the seller to demand return
of the goods within a reasonable time, deemed to be forty
days, results in the goods becoming the property of the buy-
er without any obligation to pay for them.66 If the seller per-
formed services prior to the rescission he is entitled to no com-
pensation other than to keep up to 5% of the price as a can-
cellation fee.67 The result of this provision is to supply the
consumer with a non-judicial remedy which is free of the
expense of litigation. Often the expense of litigation operates
as a deterrent to consumers seeking relief. This is true not
61 Okla. U3C § 2-503.
02 Id.
c3 Okla. U3C § 2-502(5).
64 Okla. U3C § 2-504(3).
05 Okla. U3C § 2-504(1).
66 Okla. U3C § 2-505(1).
67 Okla. U3C § 2-505 (3).
68 For examples of the problems of low income purchasers
see D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963)
1969]
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only to low-income buyers but also to those who do not have
a large enough sum at stake to justify the expense.
Opponents have criticized the cancellation provision as
unfair to the seller because it allows the buyer to cancel ca-
priciously and also violates basic contract theories by delay-
ing a binding agreement.6 9 Although this is true, the end
sought seems to justify the means used. The reputable seller
who gives value for value will not likely be adversely affect-
ed because if the buyer does use the time period to do any
comparison shopping, one of the objects of the Code provi-
sion,70 he will find that he is getting his money's worth and
will not exercise his right to cancel. Those who continue to
sell door-to-door will probably require at least a 5% down
payment to cover in full the allowable cancellation fee and
will delay delivery of the goods until the three days are up.
However this may be, the consumer should have the chance
to think over his purchase. Even the loss of 5% of the sales
price will usually be better for the buyer than to be stuck
with the purchase of an overpriced, poor quality piece of mer-
chandise which he may not have really wanted in the first
place.
REMEDIES AND PENALTIES
Article 5 of the U3C deals with remedies and penalties
and applies to actions to enforce rights arising from consumer
credit sales, consumer leases and consumer loans, and, to
extortionate extensions of credit.71
Limitations on Creditors' Remedies
In the case of a consumer credit sale the Code provides
that if the seller repossesses or accepts voluntary surrender
69 See Note, Consumer Protection: The Proposed Cooling Off
Period, 2 VALPAIso U. L. Rmv. 338, 347 (1968).
70 See Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE
L. J. 745 (1967).
71 Okla. U3C § 5-102.
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of goods which he sold or in which he had a security interest
in order to secure a debt arising from a consumer credit sale,
and the cash price was less than one thousand dollars, the
buyer is not personally liable for the unpaid balance.7 2 If
the seller elects to bring an action against the buyer for the
unpaid debt he may not also repossess the collateral, nor is
the property subject to levy or sale on execution of a judg-
ment 73 This provision forces the seller to make an election
of remedies and has been criticized.74 However, this provi-
sion seems appropriate in the situation where the buyer has
paid a substantial part of the debt on goods such as furni-
ture, clothing and appliances which have a notoriously slight
resale value. The resale value of articles such as these does
not generally come close to reflecting the practical value to
the buyer. The economic loss, when the goods are repossessed
and resold leaving the buyer still liable for the difference,
is more than can be justified for protecting the creditor. The
answer to Mr. Kripke's question 5 is that the buyer will still
have the goods which he will have paid for in full. If this is
unfair to the creditor because it forces him to "speculate
as to whether it is more worthwhile to repossess or to institute
legal action on the debt,"76 then it might be to the creditor's
best interests to put more thought into his "speculation" of
whether or not to extend credit to the prospective debtor in
72 OKLA. U3C § § 5-103 (2), (3). Compare with the Uniform
Commercial Code, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-504 (1961). In
case of conflict the Okla. U3C controls. Okla. U3C § 1-103.
73 Okla. U3C § § 5-103 (6) (a), (b).
74 See Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Con-
sumer-Credit Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 535,
557 (1967); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Cred-
itor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 445, 477 (1968).
Kripke criticizes it as being a faulty approach and asks
what the value is to the consumer when a personal suit
on the obligation is permitted.
See Kripke, supra note 74.
76 See Felsenfeld, supra note 74, at 558.
1969]
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 6 [1969], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol6/iss1/3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the first place. This provision should force the creditor to ex-
ercise more restraint in granting credit, particularly when
the collateral has low resale value. Since the seller should
be unwilling to risk extension of credit on the basis of col-
lateral alone, more weight will be given to the other "C's"
of the "Four C's" of credit.77 If this results in a consumer be-
ing unable to obtain credit or obtaining it only at a higher
rate than his more creditworthy neighbors, then economically
speaking this is the way it should operate.
It is, of course, recognized that no matter how cautious
the credit grantor may be, that debtors will default. This hap-
pens in consumer credit even with the best of credit risks
because consumer credit is usually granted on the faith in
future earning power which may not materialize through no
fault of the debtor or creditor.78 And then there is always the
debtor who can pay but won't and the debtor who uses fraudu-
lent means to build up debts. There is probably no amount
7 T. BEcKMAN, CREDITs & COLLECTION, MANAGEMENT & THEORY
(1962). The "Four C's" of credit are Character, Capacity,
Capital and Conditions. Character comprises the qualities
of a credit risk which make him want to pay when the
debt is due normally the most important. Capacity, the
ability to pay when the debt is due, is generally more im-
portant than Capital (which is usually collateral in con-
sumer transactions) since credit should be granted on the
premise that the debt will be repaid, not on the basis of
having to repossess or replevin the item. Conditions, the
economic environment in which the risk exists, is always
a factor in creditworthiness. Id. at 63.
78 "One survey concerning the relative importance of install-
ment credit standards disclosed that occupation and per-
manence of employment held first place. This would re-
flect the emphasis placed upon the debtor's continued earn-
ing power, and it is suggestive of the fact that this is often
the factor first to be regarded in consumer open-credit, as
well as in installment credit." Id. at 64.
[Vol. 6, No. I
17
Nay: Consumer Credit Sales and the Oklahoma Uniform Consumer Credit Co
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1969
CREDIT SALES AND CODE
of legislation which can prevent this. 79 Although the provi-
sion on deficiency judgments may be criticized, it appears
to be wholly in line with one of the purposes of the Code: To
protect the consumer against unfair practices by some sup-
pliers of consumer credit, having due regard for the inter-
ests of legitimate and scrupulous creditors.
Garnishment
The Code restricts the use of garnishment as a remedy
in consumer credit transactions. It prohibits garnishment be-
fore judgment ° and provides a limit on the part of a wage
earner's pay which is subject to garnishment."' The maxi-
mum part of an individual's disposable earnings (meaning
gross pay less deductions required by law) subject to gar-
nishment may not exceed the lesser of (1) 25% of disposa-
ble earnings or (2) thirty times the federal minimum hourly
wage.8 2 This provision is the same as the CCPA which limits
garnishment effective July 1, 1970,8 except that the CCPA
will cover garnishment for any purpose, whereas the Olda-
71 "We in Oklahoma had an extensive number of hearings
before our legislative council in which a large number of
debtors appeared and complained of the collection prac-
tices of their creditors. It became apparent, as one legisla-
tor observed, that what they really object is to collection."
Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented
Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 480 n. 102 (1968) quot-
ing from Commissioner Baggett's testimony, Hearings On
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code Before the NCCUSL
(August, 1967) at 440.
"[T]he risk who has either income or assets but who
neglects, delays, or refuses to pay furnishes an entirely
different picture. He is a troublesome subject. He must be
watched and account followed carefully. He is a cause of
collection expense and in many instances a reason for legal-
ly enforced collection." T. BEcKMAN supra, note 77, at 63.
80 Okla. U3C § 5-104.
81 Okla. U3C § 5-105 (2).
82 Id.
8 15 U.S.C. § § 1672, 1673 (Supp. IV 1969).
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homa UC limits it to a consumer indebtedness. The Okla-
homa UC goes one step further than the CCPA and not as
far as the Uniform Code in limiting discharge from employ-
ment for garnishment. The Oklahoma U3C provides that an
employer may not discharge an employee for garnishment
unless he has been subjected to more than two such actions
in one year.8 4 The CCPA restricts discharge unless wages
were subjected to garnishment more than once in a year 85
and the Uniform Code prohibits an employee from being dis-
charged no matter how many times his wages are garnished.8
There is no prohibition now (until the CCPA provisions come
into force) unless the garnishment arose from a consumer
credit transaction. Therefore, if the employer can determine
that the garnishment did not so arise, he can discharge the
employee without being subject to penalties.87
The Code adopts the unconscionability provision of the
Uniform Commercial Code,8 8 applying it to consumer credit
sales, leases, and loans.8 9 It also adopts the provisions of the
CCPA90 dealing with what is termed extortionate extensions
of credit and provides that the debt in that situation is un-
enforceable by the creditor.9'
4 Okla. U3C § 5-106.
85 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (Supp. IV 1969).
86 UCCC § 5.106.
8T Okla. U3C § 5-202(6) provides for reinstatement and up
to six weeks lost wages.
38 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-302. For a general discussion of
this section of the Commercial Code, see Davenport, Un-
conscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U.
MxAm L. REv. 121 (1967).
89 OKLA. USC § 5-108.
9O 18 U.S.C. § 892 (Supp. IV 1969). This provision of the CCPA
is aimed at organized crime which uses credit in its under-
world business. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm. NEWS, 90th Cong.,
Vol. 2, at 2029 (1968).
11 Okla. USC § 5-107.
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Debtors' Remedies
The Oklahoma U3C provides private remedies to the
debtor if the creditor violates provisions of the Act . 2 If a
creditor violates the restrictions on the use of negotiable in-
struments,93 the debtor does not have to pay the credit serv-
ice charge and may recover a penalty against the seller or
assignee of the seller's rights.9 4 If a seller has made a charge
in excess of that allowed, the debtor has a right to a refund"
and a refusal within a reasonable time after demand subjects
the seller to a penalty not to exceed the greater of the amount
of the credit service charge or ten times the amount of the
excess charge."( If the seller deliberately or recklessly makes
an excess charge he is subject to the penalty even though
he makes the refund. 7
In a consumer credit sale where the seller takes a se-
curity interest in the residence of the buyer, except a first
lien for the acquisition of a dwelling, the buyer has until
midnight of the third business day following in which to
rescind transaction.98 Upon rescission the buyer is not liable
for any charges, has the right to be refunded any payment
already made, and any security interest taken by the seller
is void. The Act also provides for criminal penalties'00 for
willfull violation of certain provisions.
The Oklahoma U3C is an attempt to remedy the problems
arising out of consumer credit. Whether or not the Uniform
Code has been changed enough to shift the delicate balance
92 Okla. U3C art. 5, part 2.
93 Okla. U3C § 2-403.
94 Okla. U3C § 5-202 (1).
9 Okla. U3C § 5-202 (3).
06 Okla. U3C § 5-202(4).
97 Id.
98 Okla. U3C § 5-204(1).
99 Okla. U3C § 5-204(2).
100 Okla. U3C §§ 5-301, 302; see Spanogle, The U3C-It May
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